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WHO AM I AND WHO DO YOU WANT ME TO BE? EFFECTIVELY
DEFINING A LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
SOCIAL GROUP IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS
KEITH SOUTHAM*
INTRODUCTION
While U.S. law is generally conservativel in extending rights to les-
bians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender persons (LGBT), 2 courts ad-
dressing asylum claims regularly recognize LGBT status as a basis for
asylum applications. 3 U.S. administrative and judicial remedies increasing-
* Notes and Comments Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2010-11; J.D. candidate, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2011; M.A., 2008, Southern Illinois University-
Edwardsville; B.A., 2003, University of Idaho. The author would like his advisor, Professor Natalie
Brouwer Potts, and his partner, Theodore Jackson, for their advice and support.
1. The continuing validity of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is a stark example of the
conservative approach of U.S. law. DOMA permits states to decline to recognize valid same-sex unions
(including marriages) from other states and prohibits the federal government from recognizing such
unions. Defense of Marriage Act §§ 2-3, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). The Obama adminis-
tration's Department of Justice provided a counterexample to this negative attitude towards LGBT
rights where it intervened in a lawsuit on behalf of a student subject to bullying because he was "effe-
minate." Ari Shapiro, Justice Department Intervenes in Gay Rights Suit, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 15,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=122620723. But at the same time, the
Obama administration is also currently in the difficult position of defending the parts of DOMA that a
Massachusetts federal district court in 2010 ruled unconstitutional. See Devin Dwyer, Obama Justice
Department Weighs Appeal in Defense of Marriage Act Case, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-defense-marriage-act-bind-justice-
department/story?id=1 1126465.
2. This Note uses the term "LGBT" as a blanket term. Doing so should not be read to imply that
issues in an asylum application are the same for all groups. To the contrary, women and thus lesbians
often have higher evidentiary hurdles than men. Additionally, bisexuals and transgender persons might
have greater problems in convincing adjudicators that such statuses are immutable and might also face
problems fitting into rigid stereotypes of gender and sexuality. In one especially compelling instance,
Esmeralda, a transgender Mexican asylum seeker, suffered sexual abuse and was at one point housed
among male asylum seekers where she indicated a fear for her life. Esmeralda's asylum application was
ultimately successful but only after she had suffered inexcusable sexual violence and other life-
threatening treatment by unsympathetic or unknowing immigration officials. Esmeralda: A Transgend-
er Asylum Seeker Speaks out Against Immigration Detention, RESTORE FAIRNESS BLOG (Nov. 11,
2009), http://restorefaimess.org/2009/l l/esmeralda-a-transgender-asylum-seeker-speaks-out-against-
immigration-detention.
3. Victoria Nielson, Legal Director of Immigration Equality, indicated: "Compared to other areas
[of immigration law], I'm shocked that LGBT asylum even exists.... Sometimes, I take a step back,
and I can see that this is an amazingly progressive area of the law simply because of the fact that people
can stay here because they are gay." Hollis V. Pfitsch, Homosexuality in Asylum and Constitutional
Law: Rhetoric ofActs and Identity, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 59, 72 (2006).
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ly grant protection to LGBT individuals who flee from persecution in their
home countries by permitting them to remain in the United States.4 Gener-
ally speaking, asylum functions as an exercise of compassion; but this
compassion is subject to abuse. Attempts to limit this abuse, though unders-
tandable, can result in excessive hurdles for those seeking to benefit from
asylum law. Indeed, LGBT individuals sometimes face these hurdles, un-
dermining the otherwise "progressive policy"5 of asylum law. This Note
explores the development and current treatment of LGBT identity6 as a
recognized class under U.S. asylum law.
First, this Note will briefly summarize pertinent immigration proce-
dure, address three common persecution-based applications, and introduce
the various adjudicators that hear persecution-based applications. Next, it
will address the legal history of LGBT identity as a basis for persecution-
based petitions. Following the legal history, this Note will then explore
legal frameworks courts have used to define social groups for persecution-
based petitions. Thereafter, it will highlight suggestions from U.S. law,
sociology, and feminist and queer theories that undermine stereotypes that
often factor into definitions of LGBT identity. Finally, it will explore how
stereotypical LGBT identity understandings are culture-specific and thus
difficult to apply to individuals who come to the United States from other
cultures. This Note will recommend that practitioners craft persecution-
based applications that define LGBT identity through detailed status and
conduct descriptors.
I. PERTINENT IMMIGRATION LAW PROCEDURE
Congress has ultimate power over immigration matters and has dele-
gated authority to many agencies, predominantly the Department of Ho-
meland Security (DHS), as well as the Departments of State, Justice, and
Labor.7 The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a branch
of DHS, and the Immigration Courts, established under the Department of
Justice, adjudicate asylum claims, as discussed below.
4. See Neal Broverman, Number of Gay Asylum Seekers Growing, ADVOCATE.COM (Dec. 1,
2009), http://www.advocate.com/News/DailyNews/2009/12/01/Number-of Gay_ AsylumSeekers
Growing.
5. Deborah A. Morgan, Comment, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and Sexual
Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation Asylum Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135, 139 (2006).
6. Here, the term "identity" should be understood as neutrally as possible; the goal is to avoid
implicating definitional complications that become evident as the Note progresses. Thus, "identity"
throughout this Note implies either status or conduct. See infra Part IV-V.
7. ROBERT C. DIVINE & R. BLAKE CHISAM, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE: 2010-2011 EDITION, § 2-2
to 2-3 (2010). Note: the former Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was abolished when
DHS was created; INS functions are generally distributed among three bureaus in DHS. Id. § 2-2.
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USCIS administratively adjudicates asylum cases for applicants who
have been in the United States one year or less. Where an applicant files the
necessary application within one year of his or her entry into the United
States, the applicant will first have a "non-adversarial" interview before a
USCIS asylum officer who will affirmatively adjudicate "clearly approva-
ble cases." 8 An affirmative adjudication grants the applicant the right to
remain in the United States.
If the case is not "clearly approvable" or the applicant has been in the
United States more than one year, the Immigration Court must rule on the
matter, and an immigration judge (IJ) will conduct a full hearing on the
matter.9 Generally, the IJ handles the "removal proceedings," colloquially
known as deportation proceedings, and the application simultaneously. 0 In
most, but not all cases," the government or the applicant can appeal the
IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).12 In more limited
circumstances and with proper jurisdiction, either party can appeal the BIA
decision to a U.S. court of appeals.13 Thus in some cases, up to four entities
can consider applications: asylum officers, Us, the BIA, and U.S. courts of
appeals.
Asylum officers approve only "clearly approvable" cases and, thus, do
not typically draft written opinions.14 Us can issue oral or written opi-
nions. 15 Decisions by the BIA and the courts of appeals are written. BIA
decisions are sometimes but not usually precedential, and courts of appeals
rulings are binding on future matters of the same subject in the particular
circuit. 16 Thus, statutory and regulatory language, U.S. Supreme Court
rulings, and deference to agency interpretations under the Chevron Doc-
trinel 7 are key sources of law with case decisions often carrying only per-
suasive value.
8. Id. §§ 2-12, 16-12 to 16-14. This process does not resemble a trial or other court proceeding
but instead takes the form of a visit to a government office.
9. Id at § 16-l1 to 16-12, 16-16.
10. See id §§ 11-2, 16-16.
11. Limitations include untimely appeals or appeals of discretionary decisions. See id. § 11-95 to
11-97, 11-101. See, e.g., Awuku v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 331 Fed. Appx. 167, 169 (3d Cir.
2009).
12. See DIVINE &CHISAM, supra note 7, § 11-95 to 11-97, 11-101.
13. Seeid §§2-24, 11-101.
14. See id § 16-12 to 16-14.
15. See id. § 11-95; see, e.g., Izquierdo v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 352 Fed. Appx. 682, 683 (3d
Cir. 2009).
16. See DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 7, § 2-25.
17. The Chevron Doctrine instructs courts to defer to agency interpretations of the agency's
governing statutes and regulations where the statute or regulation is ambiguous and where the agency
interpretation is reasonable or permissible. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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II. GENERAL FEATURES OF U.S. ASYLUM LAW
Aliens seeking lawful status in the United States on account of perse-
cution have three available forms of relief: (1) a petition for asylum, (2) a
petition to withhold removal, and (3) a petition for relief under the Conven-
tion Against Torture (CAT).1 8 The three claims carry successively higher
burdens in terms of the likelihood and source of persecution.' 9 Thus, where
an applicant fails to meet her burden of proof in an asylum application, it is
unlikely that she will meet the higher burdens of proof for the other
claims.20 But at the same time, the applications with higher burdens are not
as statutorily restrictive as applications for asylum.21 For example, some
crimes bar an applicant from receiving asylum but leave open withholding
of removal or relief under CAT; some crimes bar both asylum and with-
holding of removal.22 Additionally, whereas a grant of asylum is given at
the discretion of the IJ or the BIA, withholding of removal and CAT are
mandatory forms of relief. A discussion of each form of relief including the
appropriate burdens follows.
A. Asylum
For a successful asylum claim, an applicant must show that she meets
the definition of a "refugee." 23 A refugee is an alien who cannot return to
her home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."24 Evidence of past persecution raises the
presumption that fear of persecution is well-founded.25 DHS can rebut this
presumption by showing a fundamental change in circumstances in the
18. See DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 7, § 16-2, 16-11, 16-52; see, e.g., Sow v. Mukasey, 546
F.3d 953, 955-56 (8th Cir. 2008).
19. See DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 7, § 16-11, 16-52 to 16-53.
20. See id
21. See Awuku v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 331 Fed. Appx. 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2009) (the IJ
found Awuku "removable based on his criminal convictions [and] that the convictions rendered Awuku
statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal and asylum"); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec.
819, 823 (B.I.A. 1990) (granting withholding of removal to an applicant that had been convicted of
minor drug and burglary charges).
22. See, e.g., Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 470-71 (7th Cir. 2007) (particularly serious crimes
barred both asylum and withholding but did not bar relief under CAT).
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006); see, e.g., Hasalla v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 799, 803 (8th
Cir. 2004).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A). The statutory definition indicates that the alien must also be "una-
ble or unwilling" to return to her home country or to avail herself of the country's protections; these
requirements are not a concern for the scope of this Note.
25. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2010); Hasalla, 367 F.3d at 803.
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alien's home country. 26 Severe past persecution in the alien's home country
might also suffice to demonstrate an applicant's unwillingness to return to
that country regardless of fear of persecution.27 Where there is no evidence
of past persecution, the question of a well-founded fear of future persecu-
tion becomes the focus of asylum proceedings and requires the support of
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. 28 Such evidence must
show that the applicant's fear is reasonable. 29 In practice, adjudicator deci-
sions often focus on the credibility of the applicant herself.30
B. Withholding ofRemoval
An applicant may also petition for withholding of removal. 31 Such a
step precludes the U.S. government from removing32 an alien to her home
country, but does not necessarily preclude the U.S. government from re-
moving her to a third country. In a successful application for withholding
of removal, the applicant must show a clear probability that it is more like-
ly than not that she will be persecuted on account of her race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 33
Unlike an application for asylum, failure to file an application within one
year of entry into the United States does not necessarily bar relief in the
form of withholding of removal, nor are as many crimes a bar to relief.34
C. Convention Against Torture
An applicant may additionally petition for relief under the CAT. 35 In a
successful CAT claim, the petitioner must prove that, more likely than not,
26. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A); Hasalla, 367 F.3d at 803.
27. Hayrapetyan v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 2008).
28. Id. For an unusual but successful case, see Michael D. Ford, Note, How Bromfield v. Mukasey
Correctly Applied U.S. Immigration Law in a Victory for Civil Rights and a Scathing Rebuke of Jamai-
ca's Pervasive Homophobia, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 495, 513-14 (2009).
29. SeeHayrapetyan,534F.3dat 1335.
30. Morgan, supra note 5, at 141.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006).
32. "Removal" is a current term of art that is tantamount to the everyday term "deportation."
Immigration rules previously made a distinction between "deportation" and "exclusion" that has gener-
ally disappeared under the term "removal."
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A).
34. NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, BASIC PROCEDURAL MANUAL FOR ASYLUM
REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 17 (2009),
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/united-states/MIHRCmanual_200506.pdf.
35. Technically, claims cannot arise under the CAT because the treaty is not self-executing. The
claims actually arise under the act that implemented the CAT, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998 § 2242(b). 8 U.S.C. § 1231 n.2; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16-1208.18 (2010). In
accordance with common usage, however, this Note throughout uses the term "CAT claims."
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the applicant's home government has the intent to torture her. 36 The appli-
cant must meet this high burden for a successful CAT claim. In addition,
the applicant must prove that her government has the motive or purpose to
cause torture, not merely that the government is complacent in torture.37
Unlike claims for asylum or withholding of removal, a claim under the
CAT does not, however, depend on the applicant's membership in a statu-
tory class.38
D. Defining "Social Group"
In analyzing claims for asylum and withholding of removal, unique
problems arise in each of the five categories: race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, and political opinion. Membership
in a particular social group is an especially contentious category. This cate-
gory encompasses petitions based on persecution due to LGBT identity. 39
In looking at petitions based on LGBT identity, adjudicators often use vari-
ous theoretical approaches to understand the claim. For example, some
adjudicators might draw a distinction between LGBT status (or rejection of
LGBT status) and LGBT conduct (or the lack of LGBT conduct), arbitrari-
ly attaching more weight to one or the other.40 Adjudicators sometimes also
question whether the applicant's LGBT identity is changeable, that is, they
proceed from the belief that LGBT identity is chosen.41 Other adjudicators
consider the society from which the applicant comes and contemplate how
that society would respond to the putative social group, sometimes looking
for some undefined level of visibility within the society. 42 These different
lines of inquiry overlap, with some gaining prominence over others in a
given case. This Note will consider these various approaches, starting with
the first case that recognized LGBT identity as a possible basis for asylum.
36. See Sow v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2008); Pierre v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 528
F.3d 180, 189 (3d. Cir. 2008).
37. See Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189.
38. See Hayrapetyan v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008).
39. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
40. See, e.g., Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2007) (disapproving of the
IJ's focus on lack of stereotypical LGBT conduct).
41. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 822 (accepting the 1U's finding Toboso-Alfonso's
characteristic was immutable).
42. See In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-75 (B.I.A. 2007); In re C-A-, 23 1. & N.
Dec. 951, 956, 960 (B.I.A. 2006); Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Important of "Social Visibility" in
Defining a "Particular Social Group" and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual
Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 63 (2008).
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III. DEFINING LGBT UNDER ASYLUM LAW
The seminal case of In re Toboso-Alfonso43 first established homosex-
uality as a basis for a social group under U.S. asylum law. The applicant in
Toboso-Alfonso "assert[ed] that he [was] a homosexual who ha[d] been
persecuted in Cuba and would be persecuted again on account of that status
should he return to his homeland."44 Toboso-Alfonso also described syste-
matic persecution including registration with Cuban authorities, periodic
updating, unexplained detention, and penal labor.45 Supplementary evi-
dence corroborated the applicant's description of official Cuban govern-
ment actions toward homosexuals. 46 Toboso-Alfonso's testimony further
indicated that his persecution was not based on his conduct but rather based
on his status as a homosexual.47 Moreover, Toboso-Alfonso "testified that
it was a criminal offense in Cuba simply to be a homosexual." 48 The perse-
cution in Cuba culminated when Toboso-Alfonso received an ultimatum to
leave as part of the Mariel boat lift49 or to face "4 years in the penitentiary
for being a homosexual."50
Toboso-Alfonso arrived in the United States in 1980 and the U.S.
government terminated his parole 5' in 1985.52 An IJ subsequently found
Toboso-Alfonso excludable, which is to say not legally permitted to enter
the United States, denied a request for asylum, but granted withholding of
deportation.53 The Immigration and Naturalization Service 54 appealed the
decision to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision.55 The BIA affirmed
the IJ's holding that "homosexuals in Cuba" constituted a "social group"
and that Toboso-Alfonso faced a threat to freedom because of this status
43. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819.
44. Id. at 820.
45. Id. at 820-21.
46. Id. at 821.
47. Id.
48. Id
49. The Mariel boat lift describes the period in which a large number of Cuban emigrants were
allowed to or, depending on the point of view, forced to leave Cuba for the United States. The character
of the migrants as well as the impact of their migration are debated subjects. See generally David Card,
The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 245, 245-
48 (1990).
50. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 821.
51. Parole permits an alien to remain in the United States on a temporary basis where the Attorney
General "in his discretion [finds] urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C.
§ II 82(d)(5)(A) (2006).
52. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 820.
53. Id at 819. Withholding of deportation is substantially similar to withholding of removal.
54. This agency's functions are now dispersed throughout DHS.
55. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 820, 823.
1369
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
such that he was entitled to withholding of deportation. 56 In 1994, Attorney
General Janet Reno designated Toboso-Alfonso as precedent in all proceed-
ings involving the same issue or issues.57 This move provided a clear basis
for courts to consider claims based on sexual orientation. 58 In making the
designation, Attorney General Reno was indicating the formal position of
the U.S. government that its immigration laws were sympathetic or at least
not hostile to those who had faced persecution based on LGBT identity.
While this designation is not binding on the courts of appeals, many courts
nonetheless recognize the precedential value of Toboso-Alfonso.59
A. Status Versus Conduct
In its holding in Toboso-Alfonso, the BIA attempted to separate the
facts of persecution that formed the basis of the application and the poten-
tially far reaching results of its holding. The BIA stressed that its focus was
on the persecution the applicant had faced on account of his LGBT identity
and added that the issue was "not simply a case involving the enforcement
of laws against particular homosexual acts, nor . .. a case of assertion of
'gay rights."' 60 Instead, the BIA indicated:
The [Immigration] Service argues that "socially deviated behavior, i.e.,
homosexual activity[j is not a basis for finding a social group within the
contemplation of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act" and that such a
conclusion "would be tantamount to awarding discretionary relief to
those involved in behavior that is not only socially deviant in nature, but
in violation of the laws or regulations of the country as well." [Toboso-
Alfonso]'s testimony and evidence, however, do not reflect that it was
specifically activity that resulted in the governmental actions against him
in Cuba, it was his having the status of being a homosexual. 61
Here, the BIA distinguished the Service's arguments by stressing that
Toboso-Alfonso's persecution for simply being a homosexual-rather than
his actions-was the basis of his claim. But in focusing on the fact that
Toboso-Alfonso was persecuted for being a homosexual rather than for
56. See id at 822-23.
57. See Reno Designates Gay Case as Precedent, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 859, 859-60 (1994)
(describing Att'y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 9, 1994)). The Attorney General's order could plausi-
bly be read to cover only "homosexuals in Cuba," but has instead been read to apply to homosexuals in
general.
58. See, e.g., Izquierdo v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 352 Fed. Appx. 682, 683 (3d. Cir. 2009) (consi-
dering an application "on account of [the applicant's] sexual orientation") (emphasis added).
59. See Pfitsch, supra note 3, at 73; see, e.g., Pacheco v. Holder, 352 Fed. Appx. 571, 572-73 (2d
Cir. 2009) (indicating that "sexual orientation ... fall[s] under the 'particular social group' category"
but denying the appeal because applicant had failed to prove fear of persecution).
60. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 823.
61. Id. at 822.
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doing something, the BIA implicitly recognized the possibility of defining
sexual orientation either in terms of status or conduct.62
To deflect the sorts of arguments the Service made, the BIA asserted
that it was concerned solely with Toboso-Alfonso's LGBT status. This was
a necessary step because, as the language quoted above suggests, Toboso-
Alfonso's presumed LGBT conduct, such as engaging in same-sex sexual
relations, could serve as a possible basis for denying the petition. 63 U.S.
laws at the time of the petition legitimately could-and in some cases
did-criminalize some LGBT conduct, namely same-sex sodomy.64 Addi-
tionally, the BIA's focus on status may reflect the historical circumstances
of the applicant.
That Toboso-Alfonso arrived in the United States as part of the Mariel
boat lift from Cuba highlights the important background of this case. Scho-
lar Leonard Birdsong has suggested that Toboso-Alfonso was an outgrowth
of U.S. Cold War policy, which often granted asylum to individuals from
Communist countries such as Cuba.65 Thus, the apparent focus on status in
Toboso-Alfonso might be seen as necessary to both traditional interests of
U.S. foreign policy (encouraging dissidents from Communist countries)
and interests of U.S. domestic policy (desiring to avoid legitimizing LGBT
conduct or any other form of "gay rights").66 But despite the BIA's reti-
cence to deem the matter one of "gay rights," the case has subsequently
opened the door to many successful asylum claims based on LGBT identi-
ty.67
62. See Diane S. Meier, Comment, Gender Trouble in the Law: Arguments Against the Use of
Status/Conduct Binaries in Sexual Orientation Law, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 147,
152 (2008) (indicating that "[t]he status/conduct binary is the most general binary ... and separates
who someone is from what they do").
63. The dissent in Toboso-Alfonso suggests this argument but ultimately uses the fact to question
whether Toboso-Alfonso had succeed in showing the clear probability of threat to life or liberty. 20 I. &
N. Dec. at 825-26 (Vacca, Board Member, dissenting).
64. At the time Toboso-Alfonso was argued, the case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
which found no fundamental right to same-sex intercourse and upheld a challenged anti-sodomy law,
was still good law. Lawrence v. Texas has since overturned Bowers. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). But not
everyone is convinced that Lawrence will succeed in altering domestic laws with regards to LGBT
rights. See Pfitsch, supra note 3, at 83.
65. See Leonard Birdsong, A Legislative Rejoinder to "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and
Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution...," 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 197, 201-03 (2008).
66. Pfitsch argues that the strict identity/status duality in asylum law contrasts with the collapse of
such a duality in other areas of law but that all areas of law attempt to avoid extending legal benefits to
LGBT individuals. Pfitsch, supra note 3, at 87. Specifically, asylum law still "carefully avoid[s] the
extension of protections to those whose persecution targets conduct rather than identity" and that "re-
luctance to let go of the morality-driven desire to regulate sexual conduct allows discrimination against
the LGBT community to continue because discrimination based on conduct cannot be separated from
discrimination based on identity." Id. at 83. Note that Pfitsch is using the term "identity" in a way
tantamount to this Note's use of the word "status."
67. See Broverman, supra note 4.
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B. Mutable Versus Immutable
The United States joins a number of other countries in granting asy-
lum or other relief to refugees, often granting relief on account of persecu-
tion because of LGBT identity. The United Nations High Commission on
Refugees (UNHCR) has provided a definition of "refugee," part of which
now appears in U.S. law. 68 Under this definition, two methods can be used
to determine whether an applicant meets the definition of "refugee" based
on membership in a social group. The first looks for a protected characte-
ristic common to the social group; the second looks at the social perception
of the social group.
The putative social group can be understood in terms of a "protected
characteristic." 69 For most courts, a "protected characteristic" is an immut-
able characteristic, a trait that the applicant either cannot or should not be
required to alter. 70 In Toboso-Alfonso, the BIA noted that "the [Immigra-
tion] Service has not challenged the immigration judge's finding that ho-
mosexuality is an 'immutable' characteristic." 71 The BIA opinion impliedly
accepted that homosexuality is immutable. 72
Some courts, however, are less willing to accept LGBT identity as an
immutable characteristic. This view is a reaction to the perceived threat of
waves of dubious asylum applications based on LGBT identity.73 This fear
has a legitimate basis. For example, in 2009, a Washington State couple
was convicted of encouraging applicants to file asylum petitions based on
false assertions of LGBT identity. 74
68. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a
Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status ofRefugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002).
69. Id. 6.
70. In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). Pfitsch discusses the development of this
immutable characteristic test, indicating that courts have added other conditions to the baseline charac-
teristic test. See Pfitsch, supra note 3, at 63-64. For example, one test is based on association, see
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986), a proposed Department of Justice test
combines immutable characteristics and association and adds other factors, Asylum and Withholding
Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76598 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208),
and a Second Circuit approach requires characteristics that others can recognize, see Gomez v. INS, 947
F.2d 660, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1991).
71. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 201. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990).
72. See id.
73. See Marouf, supra note 42, at 91.
74. Mike Carter, Man Sentenced to Prison in Immigration Fraud Case, SEATLE TIMES, Oct. 23,
2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010125200 webmahoney23m.html.
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C. Social Perception and Social Visibility
As an alternative to the inquiry into the immutable "protected charac-
teristic," the UNHCR guidelines recommend that participating states look
to "social perception." 75 This approach requires the adjudicator to look into
the society from which the applicant comes. 76 The question, viewed from
within the applicant's home society, is what the "social perception" of the
putative social group is or would be in that society.77 Australia has empha-
sized this approach.78 The "social perception" test carries the added benefit
of offering protection to those with imputed LGBT identity.79 For example,
an applicant with a heterosexual identity could apply for asylum based on
imputed LGBT identity where her home society "perceives" her to have an
LGBT identity.80 The United States has traditionally followed the "pro-
tected characteristic" test, but as immigration practitioner Fatma E. Marouf
highlights, there has been a "sudden, significant departure" in U.S. juri-
sprudence that has reinterpreted "social perception" as "social visibility"
and demanded an unprecedented level of proof.81
The BIA has applied a "social visibility" test in defining a social
group for the purposes of an asylum claim in at least two cases. 82 In the
first case, In re C-A-, 83 the BIA held that Colombian "noncriminal drug
informants" were not a social group for asylum purposes. 84 That case in-
volved a couple who had learned information about the Cali drug cartel in
Colombia.85 After a physical attack on the couple's son, as well as attacks
on the lessee of the couple's bakery, the couple fled to the United States. 86
The BIA, in considering whether the two applicants were members of a
particular social group, acknowledged the UNHRC's "social perception"
test but focused closely on the "persecutory action toward a group [as] a
relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular socie-
75. U.N. High Comms'r for Refugees, supra note 68, 7.
76. Marouf, supra note 42, at 59-60.
77. Id at 59-62.
78. Id at 58.
79. See Pfitsch, supra note 3, at 68.
80. See id. at 68-69.
81. Marouf, supra note 42, at 51, 53, 67-68.
82. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 74-75 (B.I.A. 2007); In re C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec.
951, 957, 959 (B.I.A. 2006).
83. Unlike decisions from courts of appeals, BIA decisions sometimes truncate party names to
initials separated by dashes. Compare Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2006) (remand-
ing to the BIA), with A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (considering the Second Circuit's directions
but ultimately affirming the IJ's decision).
84. C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 961.
85. Id. at 952.
86. Id. at 952-53.
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ty." 87 Later in its opinion, the BIA equated "recognizability" with "visibili-
ty" and found that "noncriminal informants" were not "highly visible"
enough to satisfy this "social visibility" test.88 Thus, rather than analyzing
how the putative group of "noncriminal informants" would be perceived by
Colombian society, the BIA focused on the fact that Colombian society
failed to recognize this putative group. The BIA later confirmed In re C-A-
's "social visibility" approach.
In In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the BIA rejected the argument that wealthy
Guatemalans constituted a social group for asylum purposes.89 That deci-
sion rested, in part, on the recognition that wealth is a mutable characteris-
tic, but the decision also cited a dearth of "background evidence . .. that
wealthy Guatemalans would be recognized as a group that is at a greater
risk of [persecution] in particular."90 Like In re C-A-, this decision found
that the requisite "high visibility" was lacking for the putative group to
qualify as a social group for asylum purposes. The BIA implied that with
ample "background evidence ... that wealthy Guatemalans would be rec-
ognized," its decision might differ.91
While both BIA decisions implied that "social visibility" was not the
sole factor that courts should consider, neither decision indicated how
much weight courts should give to the "social visibility" factor, and neither
decision indicated what qualifies as a "highly visible" social group. 92 Thus,
rather than clarifying matters, the BIA's decisions in In re A-M-E- & J-G-
U- and In re C-A- raised more questions. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has
said that the "social visibility" approach "makes no sense" and has criti-
cized the BIA for its failure "to explain the reasoning behind the criterion
of social visibility." 93
The BIA's confusing jurisprudence leads to particular problems in
asylum applications based on LGBT identity.94 Because adjudicators using
a "social visibility" test might hypothesize that LGBT life in an applicant's
home country mirrors LGBT life in the United States, an adjudicator's
questions might "focus more on knowledge of gay trivia than on actual
experiences and culturally relevant identity markers."95 From a theoretical
87. Id at 960 (quoting U.N. High Comms'r for Refugees, supra note 68, 1 14).
88. Id at 959-61.
89. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 77 (B.I.A. 2007).
90. Id at 74.
91. Id
92. See id. at 74-75; C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 956, 960.
93. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (remanding to the BIA for consideration
of a claim based on the social group of defectors from the Mungiki tribe).
94. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 154-55.
95. Id.
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point of view, the "social visibility" test lacks an adequate basis for its as-
sumption that the perception of the outside world is an accurate reflection
of a personal trait. 96 From a practical point of view, in the area of LGBT-
based applications, this test has the wholly unwarranted effect of punishing
those applicants who are able to "cover" their true situation 97 and those
applicants who are most likely to avoid "acting gay" for fear of persecu-
tion.98 On this matter, Marouf voiced further concerns that
[r]equiring social visibility as an element of a "particular social group"
not only will make it more difficult for lesbians to prevail in asylum
claims, but also may have the discriminatory effect of rendering only ef-
feminate men or "butch" women eligible for asylum because they are the
only ones perceived as homosexual by their societies.99
D. An Overly-Demanding Standard
Although the approach in In re A-M-E- has not been universally
adopted, it does present a serious evidentiary risk to asylum applicants. 00
As previously noted, adjudicators sometimes pose questions to applicants
designed to test their knowledge of LGBT culture in the applicant's home
society.'ot Under this model, a successful applicant must be prepared to
describe the LGBT community in her home country and to place herself
within that community. However, where an applicant has elected not to
participate in the LGBT community out of fear of injury or death or for any
other reason or where the applicant's home country lacks an LGBT culture,
the applicant will not be able to meet this evidentiary hurdle.102
Judges may engage in an unintentional evidentiary sleight-of-hand be-
cause of the difficulty in proving protected status or social visibility. This
means that "[w]hen no other evidence of perception is available ... adjudi-
cators may end up relying primarily, if not exclusively, on evidence of
harm in analyzing the social group." 03 Put differently, an applicant's ina-
bility to produce evidence of participation in the LGBT community leaves
96. See Fadi Hanna, Comment, Punishing Masculinity in Gay Asylum Claims: In re Soto Vega,
No. A-95880786 (B.I.A. Jan. 27, 2004), 114 YALE L.J. 913, 920 (2005).
97. Id. at 913.
98. See id. at 920. Furthermore, doing so might contravene obligations under the 1967 Refugee
Convention to which the United States is a party. See Marouf, supra note 42, at 70-71.
99. Marouf, supra note 42, at 87.
100. See id at 76.
101. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 154-55.
102. See Hanna, supra note 96, at 916.
103. Marouf, supra note 42, at 76.
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adjudicators to rely instead on evidence of harm, conflating the separate
elements of persecution-based petitions.104
The end result of the recent BIA precedent is to punish applicants who
"cover" their sexuality while rewarding those who "reverse cover," those
who "act more visibly 'gay"' 105 In the eyes of adjudicators using the social
visibility model, those applicants who successfully "cover" have eliminated
evidence of LGBT community participation, of harm from persecution, and
thus of fear of persecution. For applicants who face such adjudicators, the
effect of successfully avoiding harm is the denial of an asylum applica-
tion. 106 In effect, adjudicators that require social visibility fail to recognize
that a fear of future persecution is not eliminated through the efforts of
LGBT applicants to hide their LGBT identity. Moreover, adjudicators us-
ing the social visibility test place especially onerous burdens on applicants
whose asylum claims are based on LGBT identity or gender.107 Women
and LGBT individuals are often forced to stay out of the public eye for fear
of injury or even death. 0 8 Fear of injury or death should provide legitimate
evidence of fear of persecution, but under the social visibility test this fear
would have the perverse effect of eliminating the most vulnerable individu-
als from meeting evidentiary standards.109
In sum, in defining what constitutes a "social group" for the purposes
of asylum applicants, adjudicators have a number of competing tests. Tobo-
so-Alfonso highlights the two halves of the status/conduct dichotomy, and
indicates that LGBT status alone suffices.110 Problems in defining LGBT
status have resulted in a number of competing tests, II including a test that
looks to the actual or probable "social perception" of the putative group.
Recently, the BIA has reinterpreted this "social perception" test as a "social
visibility" test requiring that the putative social group actually be visible in
society.112 Thus, while this selection of competing tests is frustrating for an
applicant, who can never be sure which test her adjudicator will apply, it
reflects broader difficulties in defining LGBT identity from theoretical and
cultural points of view.113
104. Id.
105. Hanna, supra note 96, at 913, 915-16.
106. See id. at 919.
107. See Marouf, supra note 42, at 78.
108. Id. at 79; see Pfitsch, supra note 3, at 70.
109. Marouf, supra note 42, at 79, 104-05; see Hanna, supra note 96, at 918.
110. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 823 (B.1.A. 1990).
111. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
112. See In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 74-75 (B.I.A. 2007); In re C-A-, 23 1. & N.
Dec. 951, 959-60 (B.I.A. 2006).
113. See Meier supra note 62, at 148-49.
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IV. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS
A. Status and/or Conduct
In Toboso-Alfonso, the BIA emphasized that its opinion was based on
the applicant's "status as a homosexual" and not the applicant's conduct.114
The BIA added that the decision was not "a case of assertion of 'gay
rights."' 115 And while the BIA was not consciously addressing any under-
lying theoretical debates about LGBT identity,"l 6 the BIA decision assumes
that anyone with an LGBT identity will readily identify as such. This as-
sumption overlooks the fact that the appellations "homosexual" and "gay"
are inappropriate or undesirable for some applicants."l7 Thus, while in
many instances it is generally true that "it is persecution based on [sta-
tus'18], not conduct, that merits protection,"ll 9 a naked focus on LGBT
status, as viewed from the United States or from the applicant's home
country, might exclude otherwise eligible applicants.
For some applicants, adopting an LGBT status may invite unwanted
cultural connotations and unwanted preconceptions of what LGBT status in
the United States means. These connotations and preconceptions could
encompass a range of features: same-sex couples in committed relation-
ships, drag queens, stereotypically masculine lesbians, or LGBT pride ral-
lies, to name a few. An applicant may reject these connotations and
preconceptions and therefore reject LGBT status while still engaging in the
type of LGBT conduct that leads to persecution and ought to suffice for
asylum applications. For example, an applicant might not embrace ideas of
LGBT activism or might wish to distance herself from stereotypes of mas-
culine lesbians but still engage in LGBT conduct such as establishing a
same-sex relationship. In any event, some applicants will recognize that in
many cases "modem heteronormativity reinforces heterosexuality as the
single and natural sexual orientation."1 20 Thus, some applicants will shy
away from voluntarily identifying with an "unnatural sexual orientation."
114. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 823
115. Id.
116. Recall that this Note consciously uses the term "identity" as broadly as possible, encompass-
ing both status and conduct, among others. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In the following
discussion, descriptors like "gay" and "lesbian" define "status" while "identity" applies where status
alone may or may not suffice for a given applicant.
117. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 149-50.
118. The unaltered quotation uses the term "identity," but the author seems to use that term in a
manner tantamount to the use of the term "status" in this Note.
119. Pfitsch, supra note 3, at 70.
120. Meier, supra note 62, at 181.
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An applicant's home culture will also influence the applicant's wil-
lingness to adopt an LGBT status. The applicant's home country may have
a well-developed notion of LGBT status or, more likely, it may fully lack a
"gay movement" or a "gay scene." This is especially true where an open
"gay lifestyle" would lead to potential or likely injury or even death. An
open "gay lifestyle" is unimaginable in a number of countries, especially
those from which LGBT asylum applicants can be expected to come, such
as Iran. 12 1 In these cases, an applicant might reject LGBT status not be-
cause she is uncomfortable with U.S. connotations and preconceptions, but
rather out of continuing fear of persecution.122 In such cases, a focus on
LGBT status alone would have the effect of excluding applicants from the
most anti-LGBT countries; tragically, these are the applicants most in need
of asylum protection. For that reason, Toboso-Alfonso's exclusive focus on
LGBT status, whether viewed from the United States or from the appli-
cants' home countries, is misplaced. But this does not mean that a focus on
conduct alone or even a combination of status and conduct provides more
favorable results.
Following Toboso-Alfonso, some adjudicators might deny asylum to
those who reject an LGBT status. On the other hand, some adjudicators
might deny asylum to those who seem to reject LGBT conduct. For exam-
ple, an adjudicator might deny asylum where the applicant was not "gay
enough" or where an applicant could not sufficiently highlight her own
LGBT conduct.123 Perhaps most harshly of all, some adjudicators require
both status and conduct. For example, in Shahinaj v. Gonzales, the IJ de-
nied the application for asylum, noting that "[n]either [Shahinaj's] dress
nor his mannerisms, nor his style of speech give any indication that he is a
homosexual."l 24 Here, the IJ was prepared to believe Shahinaj's claim
about status only through corroborating conduct evidence. Luckily for Sha-
hinaj, when his appeal was considered by the Eighth Circuit, that court
faulted the IJ for applying a "personal and improper opinion [that] Shahinaj
did not dress or speak like or exhibit the mannerisms of a homosexual."1 25
To succeed under this status-and-conduct model that the IJ in Shahinaj
used, an applicant would have two hurdles to overcome. First, the applicant
would have to agree to adopt an LGBT moniker, "gay," putting aside any
negative connotations the applicant may find in both U.S. culture and his
home culture. Second, the applicant would also have to engage in some sort
121. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 158.
122. Marouf, supra note 42, at 79, 104-05; see Hanna, supra note 96, at 918.
123. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 136.
124. Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original).
125. Id. at 1029.
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of stereotypically LGBT conduct that vividly corroborates U.S. connota-
tions of LGBT status. 126 The harsh status-and-conduct test for LGBT iden-
tity would seem to exclude a number of applicants with legitimate
persecution-based claims.
B. Conduct Deconstructed
The previous discussion suggests both that status and conduct are easi-
ly distinguishable and that they are readily understandable. However, U.S.
law, sociology, and feminist and queer theory all suggest that this is not the
case. To start, some adjudicators will approach the question of LGBT iden-
tity with the preconception that "[b]eing gay ... is considered mutable
conduct," and that LGBT identity is a choice.127 For these adjudicators,
LGBT status and conduct are mere manifestations of the same choice. A
recent and prominent U.S. law similarly collapsed the distinction between
status and conduct in the U.S. military's former "Don't Ask Don't Tell"
(DADT) policy.1 28 DADT prohibited homosexual "conduct" in the mili-
tary.129 At first glance, this seems clear, but DADT defined "conduct" in
broadly inclusive terms, including the "conduct" of a service member
"stat[ing] that he or she [wa]s a homosexual or bisexual."' 30 Thus, DADT
"effectively create[d] a nearly irrefutable connection between homosexual
status and homosexual conduct."'31 DADT swept status and conduct to-
gether in all but the most limited of circumstances. Indeed, a reading of the
statutory language and media reports confirm that being a "homosexual or
bisexual" was fine, so long as the service member never told anyone this
fact.132 While DADT is no longer good law, the effect of DADT may con-
tinue to influence U.S. jurisprudence for an indefinite length of time. Simi-
larly, a short line in the 2010 Supreme Court case Christian Legal Society
v. Martinez suggests a status/conduct collapse, albeit with a more LGBT-
positive purpose: "Our decisions have declined to distinguish between sta-
tus and conduct in this context." 33
126. See id
127. Meier, supra note 62, at 153.
128. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 § 574, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006),
repealed by Don't Ask Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010).
129. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, § 574.
130. Id.
131. Meier, supra note 62, at 159.
132. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, § 574.
133. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010) (allowing a state university to adopt a universally applicable "all-comers" policy
even if such a policy would conflict with a group's beliefs); see Adam Liptak, Looking for Time Bombs
and Tea Leaves on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/us/politics/20bar.html.
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Meanwhile, sociology, queer theory, and feminist theory question the
theoretical legitimacy of categorical definitions and dualities such as status
and conduct. Sociologist Dawne Moon describes sociological movement
towards "denaturalizing the notion that sex as we know it is both natural
and private."l 34 Moon compares this idea to a goal of queer theory: "desta-
bilizing rigid binary forms of thinking that obscure the ways that people
live and understand themselves as sexual and gendered." 35 Three binaries
are important in considering petitions for asylum based on LGBT identity:
sex (woman/man), gender (female/male), and sexuality (homosex-
ual/heterosexual). "Sex" traditionally describes biological features, "gend-
er" traditionally describes the culturally-based outward expression of "sex,"
and "sexuality" traditionally describes to which "sex" or "gender" a person
is attracted. Feminist and queer theorist Judith Butler argues that these bi-
naries are cultural constructs. 136 Butler argues that it is only our perfor-
mances within a given society that constitute a sex, gender, and sexuality
identity.137 Or, in the words of famous drag performer RuPaul: "You're
born naked-the rest is drag." 38 Thus, for an adjudicator to focus on either
status or conduct misses the point. The two are simply part of the same
whole; conduct defines and is defined by status. An especially important
point from Butler's performative model needs highlighting: Where sex,
gender, and sexuality are mere social constructs, adjudicators will encoun-
ter incongruities when applying U.S. cultural constructs to the different
cultures from which asylum applicants come. This point adds another ex-
planation as to why some applicants reject U.S. cultural constructs. Appli-
cants already have their own cultural constructs; they have no need for
those of another culture.
Butler's argument that sex, gender, and sexual orientation are social
constructs gains support by comparing the United States and other western
countries to a non-western country. Nepal's highest court ruled in 2007 that
"sexual minorities" are entitled to equal rights.139 The most prominent re-
sult of Nepal's high court ruling is likely to be the new Nepalese Constitu-
tion, which is expected to provide protections to "sexual minorities,"
134. Dawne Moon, Culture and the Sociology of Sexuality: It's Only Natural?, 619 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCL 183, 186 (2008).
135. Id. at 195.
136. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 9,16-
17, 24-25, 30 (1990).
137. See id
138. Can IBe Blunt? RuPaul Lets Down Her Hair, OUT, Feb. 2010, at 34.
139. Tilak Pokharel, In Conservative Nepal, a Tribune for the 'Third Gender' Speaks Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/world/asia/20pant.html.
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including marriage rights and non-discrimination laws.140 These equal
rights have manifested in at least one gay man receiving an identity card
bearing the gender "both."'41 This mirrors the general practice in Nepal of
using the descriptor "third gender" to refer to the broad category that I have
been calling "LGBT."l 42 From this isolated sliver of Nepalese culture, a
sharp contrast with the United States is clear. Those with an LGBT identity
in the United States do not use the term "third gender," nor does LGBT
identity manifest within the gender duality "female/male." Nepal has con-
ceptualized a triality of "third/female/male." U.S. culture has largely kept
the gender duality "female/male" but has added a sexuality duality "homo-
sexual/heterosexual." Given this, why would a "third gender" Nepalese
person want to choose, for example, to identify as a "female homosexual"?
Even within U.S. jurisprudence, some cracks are apparent in the oth-
erwise rigid dualities of sex and gender. In the area of sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,143 the Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized Butler's gender performance paradigm. In Price- Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the Court encountered an allegation that Price-Waterhouse, an
accounting firm, did not promote a woman candidate to partner status be-
cause she did not conform to the partners' stereotypes of how women
should act. 144 After the Price-Waterhouse board placed Ms. Hopkins's
promotion on hold, she was advised to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry." 45 In other words, Hopkins faced criticism for not engaging
in stereotypical woman/female conduct, for not performing her gender.146
The Supreme Court indicated that the failure of Price-Waterhouse to pro-
mote Hopkins because of her "failure" to live up to gender stereotypes was
a violation of Title VII protections against discrimination based on
140. Utpal Parashar, Nepal Charter to Grant Gay Rights, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/nepal/Nepal-charter-to-grant-gay-rights/Articlel-
499154.aspx.
141. Pokharel, supra note 139.
142. See id
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
144. Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989) (plurality), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The holding in Price Waterhouse technically ad-
dressed whether a "mixed motive" case, that is, a case in which both a permissible (e.g., ability to do a
job) and an impermissible (e.g., sex) motive influenced an adverse employment decision. Section 107
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 supersedes Price Waterhouse by indicating that an impermissible
motive alone makes an adverse employment decision a violation of Title VII, whether or not the em-
ployer would have made the same adverse employment decision absent the impermissible motive. Thus,
Price Waterhouse's implicit recognition of the overlapping nature of "sex" and "gender" is unchanged.
145. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
146. See id. (quoting fellow employees who indicated Hopkins was "macho," "overcompensated
for being a woman," and should attend "a course at charm school") (citations omitted).
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"sex."1 47 The Court implicitly indicated that Title VII bans discrimination
based on both status (Title VII specifies "sex") as well as conduct (sexual
stereotyping). 148
From a practical point of view, regardless of the source or effect of the
conceptual framework, adjudicators ultimately decide whether an applicant
has succeeded in proving she is a member of a social group.149 Some adju-
dicators will be familiar with Price Waterhouse, or with Judith Butler; oth-
ers will be more familiar with DADT. It is also unfortunately true that at
least some "immigration judges across the country [will] demonstrate[]
marked stereotyping of and homophobic assumptions about gays and les-
bians." 50 For this reason, some practical considerations follow.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This state of the law and the complexity of the issues of identity sug-
gest different avenues that can be used to address the problem. After strate-
gies that others have proposed, this section proposes a strategy that focuses
on the adjudicator and the applicant as well as the background and belief of
both the adjudicator and the applicant. Specifically, this strategy suggests
that, where appropriate, the "social group" category should be defined in
terms that accurately describe the applicant's own understanding of her
LGBT identity but also that flag the applicant as falling within the adjudi-
cator's pre-existing notions of LGBT identity. Additionally, this strategy
recognizes that the present standard for defining "social group" is at best
unclear or at worst improperly restrictive, but attempts to work within this
ambiguity to present the applicant's LGBT identity in a manner that can
encompass different conceptions of the proper standard.
In the LGBT context, practitioners are legitimately faced with a di-
lemma of how to present a potential persecution-based petition. Immigra-
tion practitioner Paul O'Dwyer suggests adjusting claims where possible to
fit within the precedents of a given circuit. 151 Following precedent is an
especially effective strategy for applicants in the Ninth Circuit in light of its
147. See id. at 258. The holding in Price Waterhouse is actually much more narrow: "when a
plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,
the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving ... that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs gender into account." Id. The holding, however, uses the
word "gender" twice, despite the fact that Title VII bans employment discrimination "because of...
sex." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
148. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
149. See Meier, supra note 62, at 169.
150. Ford, supra note 28, at 515; see Morgan, supra note 5, at 137.
151. See Paul O'Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear of Having My Sexual Orientation Asylum Claim
Heard in the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185, 212 (2007).
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flexible social group tests based on association. 152 In a less friendly circuit
or in front of a less friendly BIA member, IJ, or asylum officer, an appli-
cant faces the specter of "[j]udges ... imposing their personal views on
whether some of the most intimate aspects of a person's life are a constitu-
ent part of personal identity." 53
Still another alternative would be judge-focused and would encourage
judges to "reject unconsciously [discriminatory] evidentiary requirements
that attach more worth to malleable physical characteristics and knowledge
of gay trivia than to testimony about same-sex relationships and persecu-
tion by government officials who threaten to expose the applicant's homo-
sexuality." 54 This shift in focus to same-sex relationships and
governmental persecution, though not without its own problems, is a laud-
able goal. Unfortunately, neither practitioners nor applicants are in a posi-
tion to constrain adjudicators' thought processes. Furthermore, while this
seems to be the approach that is most plausibly understood from UNHRC
guidelines, the truth is that adjudicators often make their decisions either
based on or at least influenced by their attitudes and preconceptions of
LGBT culture.155 Moreover, "the lack of prescribed, objective standards
allows judges to indulge their own prejudices and stereotypes regarding
LGBT applicants." 56 This lack of standards suggests that legislative action
is in order. Indeed, scholar Leonard Birdsong has proposed such a legisla-
tive fix.' 5 7 However, just as practitioners and applicants cannot constrain
adjudicators' thought processes, they are individually unable to effect legis-
lative change.
As an alternative, this Note recommends an approach that takes into
account the different backgrounds through which adjudicators and appli-
cants view LGBT identity. Both theory and case law suggest defining the
social group using terminology that encompasses but does not require both
status and conduct. This approach is pragmatic in nature and does not re-
solve the theoretical debates regarding conflicts between status and con-
duct. This approach recognizes that, for all of the legal and theoretical
paradigms outlined above, different adjudicators will find different strate-
gies more cogent. Additionally, this approach recognizes that an applicant's
background may dovetail nicely with U.S. LGBT culture or that it may be
completely incompatible. Thus, appealing to the widest variety of legal and
152. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
153. Meier, supra note 62, at 149-50.
154. Morgan, supra note 5, at 157.
155. See O'Dwyer, supra note 151, at 206.
156. Id. at 210.
157. See Birdsong, supra note 65, at 220-22.
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theoretical backgrounds and wisely using status and conduct descriptors to
highlight similarities or differences between U.S. and applicant cultures
offers a better chance of success.
As a threshold matter, in defining an LGBT social group for the pur-
poses of a persecution-based application for asylum, a practitioner should
start with a status descriptor such as "gay men in Cuba" or "Armenian les-
bians." These terms fall within the social group that Toboso-Alfonso estab-
lished and are the quickest signals to an adjudicator that LGBT identity is
the basis of the application. While the simple status descriptor may suffice
for a number of adjudicators and for a number of applicants, this will not
always be the case. Some adjudicators will want more proof of what about
"gay men in Uganda" makes their identity immutable or why "Armenian
lesbians" is believable enough not to be a scam. And at the same time,
some applicants will object, arguing that there is no "lesbian scene" in Ar-
menia or that being "gay" in Uganda is a completely different affair than
being "gay" in the United States. As indicated, Nepalese "third gender"
persons might reject the imposition of a U.S. sexuality duality (homosex-
ual/heterosexual) on top of a gender duality (female/male) and instead
adopt a gender triality (third/female/male). For such applicants, a two part
status descriptor will be appropriate: "Nepalese third gender person or what
might be termed a 'female homosexual' in the U.S." Here, the status de-
scriptor appeals to both the adjudicator, putting the status into terms that he
or she is more likely to be familiar with ("female homosexual") and also to
the applicant, preserving her cultural identity ("third gender").
For incredulous adjudicators and for applicants unwilling to adopt
U.S. connotations, attaching some description of LGBT conduct will offer
additional help. For adjudicators, evidence of LGBT conduct will help
alleviate worries about granting asylum to applicants who falsely claim an
LGBT identity solely for the purposes of gaining asylum. Evidence of
LGBT conduct over time might also help to sway those adjudicators that
regard LGBT identity as "mutable" or a "choice." For applicants, conduct
descriptors might help to alleviate concerns about what the terms "lesbian,"
"gay," "bisexual," or "transgender" actually mean.
For example, an applicant might feel that he is fleeing persecution
based on a long-term relationship with another man. This applicant's rela-
tionship in a number of countries would not be typified by the comparative-
ly high-profile relationships that many same-sex couples in the United
States have. The applicant's family may know nothing of the relationship,
to say nothing of the applicant's friends, colleagues, or acquaintances. The
applicant and his boyfriend likely rarely go out in public as a couple and
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almost surely do not attend pride rallies or go to gay bars. Thus, for this
applicant, the descriptor "gay men in Uganda" might not fit because of the
connotations that come along with that descriptor, like being out to family,
friends, and coworkers; going out in public as a couple; attending pride
rallies; or visiting gay bars. Here, it might be important to use conduct de-
scriptors to indicate why the relationship was kept secret or why the appli-
cant faced persecution. Of course, the facts of an applicant's background
will dictate any social group descriptor, but in this example, a possibility is
"gay men in Uganda who must hide even their long-term same-sex rela-
tionships because of past violence on account of such relationships" or
"gay men in Uganda who must hide even their long-term same-sex rela-
tionship because of fear of personal injury on account of such relation-
ships." This type of detailed social group definition and explanation will
demonstrate the legitimacy of claims to incredulous judges and will also
sweep in individuals who shy away from traditional LGBT status descrip-
tors. Here, the conduct is sustained over a period of time ("long-term"),
indicating that the identity is immutable. The conduct also indicates that the
stereotypical LGBT activities did not and could not occur for fear of vi-
olence. Thus, the conduct descriptor could also provide a reason for the
persecution while not sweeping in the entire gamut of LGBT culture for
applicants who would find this uncomfortable. At the same time, practi-
tioners must be careful not to describe a putative social group only in terms
of past or likely future persecution; the chosen descriptors must highlight
commonality among members of the putative social group other than
through persecution.
The status-with-conduct approach gains force when considering the
recent case of Halmenschlager v. Holder, in which the Tenth Circuit used
the phrase "self-described homosexual with effeminate traits" to identify an
applicant for asylum.158 While the applicant's petition for asylum was ul-
timately unsuccessful because the applicant failed to prove fear of future
persecution,159 the Tenth Circuit's characterization of the applicant fell in
line with the approach advocated in this Note. 160 In its opinion, the Tenth
Circuit's use of descriptors was almost exclusively status-oriented and
suggested that the court found bald status descriptors sufficient.161 In de-
158. Halmenschlager v. Holder, 331 Fed. Appx. 612, 615 (10th Cir. 2009).
159. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the BIA's holding that the applicant had failed to demonstrate
past persecution or a fear of future persecution that was on account of his being "homosexual and 'very
feminine."' Id at 622.
160. The opinion does not actually discuss the definition of the social group in question. See id. at
615-17. The discussion focuses mostly on questions past and future persecution.
161. See id.
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scribing the social group in question, the opinion almost exclusively used
the status terms "homosexual(s)" and "sexual orientation." 62 The opinion
did, however, also include some conduct references, for example, "trans-
vestite prostitutes," "same-sex partner[s]," and "jilted lovers."l 63 But the
bulk of the opinion adopted a paradigm that recognized the possibility of
asylum for individuals persecuted because of their status as "homosexuals"
or because of their "sexual orientation." Additionally, the applicant himself
used the term "homosexual," indicating his comfort with the connotations
of the term. Thus, it is clear that both the three-judge appellate panel and
the applicant were comfortable with status descriptors in this case.
Notably, however, in a few instances, the Tenth Circuit's opinion did
not exclusively use status descriptors. Two phrases clearly implicated both
status and conduct: "homosexual with effeminate traits" and "homosexual
and 'very feminine.'" 64 The applicant himself used the first phrase, and
the IJ used the second phrase. 165 The opinion does not provide additional
background on the applicant's or the IJ's concepts of LGBT status, but both
were more interested in conduct than the Tenth Circuit. The different fo-
cuses from three different actors in this case highlight the different ap-
proaches that are possible when defining an LGBT social group. The IJ
seemed to treat both status and conduct as relevant and used both to reach a
conclusion. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit focused only on status. The inclu-
sion of a conduct descriptor did not, however, negatively affect treatment
of the application in the Tenth Circuit. This fact shows another positive
aspect of the approach, namely that, while the inclusion of an "unneces-
sary" descriptor does not seem to be harmful, the exclusion of a "neces-
sary" descriptor might well be.
The recommended approach has certain limitations. Where an appli-
cant's history and background show little LGBT conduct or where the ap-
plicant has successfully "covered," the approach may be unworkable.
Unfortunately, this problem mirrors a major problem of the "social visibili-
ty" test. But unlike the "social visibility" test, the suggested approach relies
on status as well. Thus, where lack of conduct is ostensibly fatal under a
"social visibility" test, it is not necessarily fatal under this approach. Simi-
larly, where conduct alone is fatal under a "protected characteristic" test, it
is not fatal here. Evidentiary problems will constrain any approach, but
appealing to both status and conduct will alleviate significant problems
162. See id
163. Id at 616, 622.
164. Id at 615, 617.
165. Id.
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while positively resolving a greater amount of legal and theoretical ap-
proaches.
CONCLUSION
The current landscape for LGBT individuals who file persecution-
based applications is increasingly friendlier, and U.S. administrative and
judicial remedies continue to provide better options for such individuals to
lead persecution-free lives in the United States. Still, future LGBT asylum
cases will no doubt continue to struggle with the various methods that can
be used to conceptualize and test LGBT identity. Moreover, applicants,
adjudicators, and attorneys will continue to work under sometimes conflict-
ing conceptual paradigms. In order for all parties to work out these differ-
ences successfully, an approach that uses and explains both LGBT status
and LGBT conduct is warranted. The recommendations in this Note pro-
vide a framework to help craft complex descriptions of social groups.
These complex descriptions will appeal to a broad range of adjudicators by
taking many different paradigms and evidentiary concerns into account. In
this way, the approach will help improve access to the benefits of asylum
law for the truly needy. Indeed, "[d]espite the poor reputation of the immi-
gration courts and asylum offices as being arbitrary and hostile to asylum
seekers, they have proven themselves far more receptive to sexual-
orientation based protection claims than the federal courts."1 66 The ap-
proach in this Note will help ensure that this positive trend continues and
that U.S. asylum law continues to provide a refuge for individuals who face
persecution because of their identity.
166. O'Dwyer, supra note 151.
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